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A RE-ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND 
SOCIAL LANDSCAPE OF DESEGREGATION FROM 
PLESSY V. FERGUSON TO PARENTS lNVOL VED IN 
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE SCHOOL 
DISTRICT No. 1 
Stephen rf. Caldas, Ph.D.* and CarlL. Bankston III, Ph.D.** 
ABSTRACT 
This article re-examines the legal, political, and social 
history of school desegregation from the Plessy u. Ferguson 1 
decision of 1896 through the most recent 2007 Supreme Court 
ruling in the Seattle and Louisville desegregation challenges. 2 
We first consider the initial legal rationale and justification for 
school desegregation that was presented to the Supreme Court 
in 1954, and look at how rationale shaped its historic Brown I 
decision.:l Following a critical look at the desegregation 
experience from Brown I and Brown 114 to the turn of the 
twenty-first century, we consider how the Connecticut Supreme 
Court case of Sheff u. O'NeiZZC' set the stage for radical change 
m the direction of future desegregation litigation. We also 
· Profpssor. D<·partnwnt of Foundations, IPadership and l'olicy Studi,•s. Hofst rn 
Uniwrsity. 
"Professor, Department of Soeiolof(y, Tulane Univ<>rsity. 
1. PIPss:-• v. Ferguson. Hi:l U.S. fi:l7. fi51 (1 H!.Jfi) (holding that facilities for blacks 
and whites could bP "separate but Pqual" and that the Fom·tt·Pnth Anll'ndnwnt 
was not intended to secure social equality). 
2. Pan•nts lnvolwd in Cmty. Sch. v. SeattlP Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 27:3H. 
276H (2007) 
:i. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brou•n [), 847 U.S. 4H:l. •194 (19fi4) (rejPcting thP 
"steparate but <'qual" proposition). 
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (/3rotL'I1 II). :)49 U.S. 294. :101 (19fi:)) (ordering southem 
school distt·icts to impiPment flmum I with "all delib,~rate speed"). 
fi. Slwf'f' v. O'N.,ill, fi7H J\.2d l2fi7. 12Hfi (Conn. 1996) (holding that the 
legislature must take responsibility to n•medy dt• jure and de facto segn•galion i:1 
public schools). 
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consider the potential impact on school desegregation of the 
2003 Grutter u. Bollinger6 and Gratz u. Bollinger7 Supreme 
Court decisions involving affirmative action in admissions at 
the University of Michigan. Finally we weigh the potentially 
huge impact of the 2007 decision overturning the Seattle and 
Louisville desegregation plans that used race of students in 
making school assignment decisions. 8 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this article we take a fresh look at the legal, political, 
and social history of school desegregation beginning with its 
antecedents in the Plessy u. Ferguson9 decision of 1896, which 
legalized racial discrimination through its "separate but equal" 
holding. We re-visit the legal rationale and justification for 
school desegregation that was presented to the Supreme Court 
in 1954, and consider how these arguments shaped its historic 
Brown I decision. 10 We carefully re-examine the half-century of 
struggle to desegregate America's schools in relation to the 
larger social and political context within which the 
desegregation drama was being played out. Our analysis 
concludes with the most recent 2007 Supreme Court 
desegregation decisions, which struck down the Seattle, 
Washington and Louisville, Kentucky desegregation plans that 
considered the race of students in assignment to schools. 11 
Overall, we conclude that coercive desegregation orders in 
general have not worked, that major Supreme Court 
desegregation decisions have often been significantly 
influenced by the social and political milieu of the times, and 
that top-down efforts to desegregate schools have often 
exacerbated rather than remedied the racial segregation of 
schools. Many policy makers fail to understand that schools are 
the products of the social contexts in which they are situated, 
and are not easily manipulated as instruments to socially 
reconstruct society. As for efforts to redistribute students on 
fi. Grutter v. Bolling-er, 539 U.S. :=HJn. :143-44 (2003). 
7. Gratz v. Bolling-er, 5:19 U.S. 244, 276 (2003). 
H. Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2768. 
9. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 5:37, fi52 (1896). 
10. Brown v. 13d. of Educ .. 347 U.S. 4~-l:1, 494 (1954). 
ll. Parents. 127 S. Ct. at 2768. 
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socioeconomic grounds, the history of the socioeconomic 
balancing of schools is not sufficiently extensive to conclude on 
empirical grounds that the redistribution of students on 
socioeconomic grounds rather than racial grounds will not 
work. However, the logic of our examination suggests that top-
down efforts aimed at socioeconomic balancing to desegregate 
schools will be no more successful than desegregation efforts 
aimed directly at race have been. 
In Section II, we begin our discussion with the "separate 
but equal" doctrine of Plessy to its legal demise in Brown I. 
Then, we create a typology of sorts, and classify the subsequent 
history of desegregation into six distinct periods, describing key 
legal, political, and social developments within each time-
frame. These periods are: 
1) the time span from Brown I (and subsequently Brown II) 
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 when many southern school 
systems resisted school desegregation (Section III); 13 
2) the "freedom of choice" period immediately following the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 14 when school systems were prodded 
to begin the process of desegregating schools or face the 
consequence oflosing federal funding (Section IV); 15 
3) the period of more "affirmative" federal involvement in 
school desegregation beginning with the 1968 Green decision 
(Section V); 16 
4) the period of decreasing federal activism in desegregation 
starting in the mid -1970s and extending through the 1980s 
(Section VI); 17 
5) the unitary (i.e., ostensibly "integrated") status era of the 
late 1980s into the early 2000s, characterized by minimal 
governmental involvement in school racial composition. During 
this period the Court facilitated the attainment of unitary 
12. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. 88-:352, 78 Stat. 241 (19()4). 
13. STEPHEN.]. CALDAS & CARLL. BANKSTON, FORCED TO FAIL: THE PARADOX OF 
SCHOOL DESEGHE(;i\TION 28 -29 (2007) [hereinafter FOHCED TO F,\ILJ. 
14. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub L. 88-:352, 7R Stat. 241 (1964). 
15. GAHY 0RFIELIJ. THE RECONSTHUCTION OF SOUTHEI{N EDUCATION: THE 
SCHOOLS AND THE 19fi4 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 341 (1969). 
16. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 4:10, 441-12 (1961') !holding that the 
"freedom of choice plan" failed to satisfy the school board's nesponsibility to end 
segregation in schools). 
17. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken[). 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974) (ruling out cross-
district desegregation remPdi,,s, such as cross-district busing, to further integrate 
districts charged with de jure violations). 
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status of desegregating school districts by allowing them to 
redress past de jure violations "to the extent practicable"18 
(Section VII) and finally; 
6) the current and expected trends in school desegregation 
in the light of significant judicial action by the Connecticut 
Supreme Court in Sheff, 19 the Supreme Court's 2003 rulings on 
affirmative action in Grutter20 and Gratz21 , and its 2007 
desegregation rulings in the Seattle I Louisville22 decisions 
(Section X). 
II. PRE-BROWN SEGREGATION: THE "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" 
DOCTRINE 
A. Institutionalization of the Doctrine 
By the time of the Plessy v. Ferguson23 "separate but 
equal"24 decision of 1896, the white-dominated governments in 
the South had already largely undone any progress made 
toward integrating freed blacks into southern society during 
Reconstruction. 25 In the time after Plessy v. P'erguson and 
before Brown I, American history had an uncanny resemblance 
to the legal Apartheid of South Mrica. 26 Jim Crow legislation 
in states and localities across the South both disenfranchised 
blacks politically and slowly separated blacks from whites in 
many social spheres including restaurants, public 
transportation, and housing. 27 Armed with majority political 
control, white power-elites who dominated local and state 
governmental institutions ensured that blacks were politically 
18. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 4\18 U.S. 2::l7, 241 (1991). 
19. Sheff v. O'Neill, G78 A.2d 12G7. 127G (Conn. 1996). 
20. Grutter v. Bollinger, G:39 U.S. 982, :i43-44 (200:3). 
21. Gratz v. Bollinger, G:39 U.S. 244, 276 (200:)). 
22. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. 127 S. Ct. 27:18, 
2768 (2007). 
2:1. Plessy v. Ferguson. 16:1 U.S. 5::l7, 5Fi0--51 (189G). 
24. The phrase ''separate but equal" actually comes from ,Justice Harlan's 
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 1 o:l U.S. at Fi52 n.2H (Harlan .• J., disst>nting). 
25. RIC'HAIW WOill\lSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF ,JIM CROW 2H-41 (2004). 
26. Tn 1948, South Africa passed legislation banning mixed-race marriages: the 
Group Areas Act of 19Fi0 separated blacks and whites and the Separate Amenities Act 
of 195:3 permitted separate buses, hospitals, schools. and universities. 
27. DOUCLAS MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMEI{ICAN AI'AI\TIIEIIJ: SECilE<;ATION 
A:-.Jll THE MAKIN(; OF TilE UNIJERCLASS 26 (1 ~198). 
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barred from challenging the "separate but equal" doctrine. 28 
With the removal of northern troops in 1877 and the end of 
"Radical Republican"29 efforts to reconstruct the South, black 
rights were gradually stripped away and blacks were 
increasingly relegated to their own institutions and social 
spheres, separate from whites. Thus, in Plessy v. Ferguson, 30 
the Supreme Court in a sense simply validated and rendered 
constitutional the social reality already prevalent throughout 
most of the South: blacks were indeed "separate."al However, 
allowing states and localities to ignore de facto (actual) 
segregation problems and adopt de jure (legal) segregation 
policies opened a Pandora's Box that would take fifty years to 
legally shut. It was not long after the Plessy ruling that legal 
segregation was extended to schooling. In 1899, the Supreme 
Court upheld a Georgia school board's action to close a black 
high school and build two black elementary schools in its 
place. 32 The only option available for the displaced black high 
school students was parochial education.:i:i In a legal rationale 
that echoed the states' rights philosophy prior to the Civil War, 
the Supreme Court did not interfere in the board's decision to 
prohibit black students from attending the white high school, 
ruling that the entire issue was a state, not a federal, matter. 34 
Nine years later, in the case of Berea College u. Kentucky, 35 the 
Supreme Court upheld a Kentucky law that prohibited 
educational institutions of higher learning from teaching 
28. Id. at 154-G5. 
29. See r.;enerally HANS LOUIS TREFOUSSE, THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS: LINCOLN'S 
VANGUARD FOR RACIAL .JUSTICE (1()75). 
30. Plessy v. Ferguson, 1G3 U.S. 537,551-52 (189G). 
31. Stephen .J. Caldas, The Plessy and Grutter Decisions: A Study in Contrast 
and Comparison, G7 OHIO ST. L .• J. GG, G9 (200G) [hereinafter The l'lessy and Grut.t.er 
Decisions]. 
:12. Cumming v. Sch. Bd. of Richmond County, 17fi U.S. fi28, fi4fi (18BB). 
:33. ld. "[P]arochial education refers to the schooling obtained in elementary and 
secondary schools that are maintained by Roman Catholic pa1·ishes, Protestant 
churches or .Jewish organizations; that are separate from thl' public system and that 
provide education based on sectarian principles." Britannica Online Encyclopedia, 
Parochial Education. h ttp:l/www. britannica.com/pb/a rtidl'- 905854 //parochial-
education (last visited Oct. 15, 2007). 
34. Cumming. 17G U.S. at 545 (stating that "any interferenc(' on the part of 
Federal authority with tlw managPment of such schools cannot lw justified except in 
the case of a ch,ar and unmistakable disregard of rights sPcured by the supreme law of 
the land"). 
35. Berea Coli. v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 58 (1908). 
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blacks and whites if classrooms for each race were less than 
twenty-five miles apart.:36 Thus, in the Berea College ruling the 
Supreme Court significantly extended the Plessy "separate but 
equal" doctrine to include institutions of higher education.37 
Still, blacks did maintain their own healthy social and political 
institutions, most notably the black church:38 and black 
communities, though separate, remained strong. In 1909, the 
NAACP was founded by a committee, which included W.E.B. 
DuBois, to protect blacks from lynching and to defend and 
extend civil rights to blacks. 39 
B. 1930s-1954: Diminishing the Doctrine of 
"Separate but Equal" 
It was during the 1930s that the first significant legal 
fissure in the "separate but equal" doctrine appeared. In State 
of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the NAACP mounted a 
Fourteenth Amendment challenge against a Missouri State 
Supreme Court ruling that upheld the University of Missouri's 
law school policy of not admitting blacks. 40 At this time there 
were law schools for blacks within the state (in other words, 
there was no "equal" black institution). 41 The Supreme Court 
overturned the state ruling, arguing that blacks had to be 
admitted to the all white law school since no "separate" 
facilities were available for blacks. 42 
World War II marked growing sensitivity among blacks 
about their inherently unequal status at home as they fought 
foreign oppression in the European and Pacific theatres only to 
return to a country where racial discrimination was still 
practiced on a broad scale. 43 Following the war, black leaders 
like Walter White of the NAACP and labor organizer A. Philip 
Randolph publicly demanded an end to the practice of 
segregated military units. 44 President Truman ultimately 
36. Id. at 60. 
37. See id. 
38. ERIC' C. LI0!COLN & LAWREl\iCE H. MAMIYA, THE BLACK CHURCH IN THE 
AFHICA0! AMEHIC\N EXI'EBIENCE 8 (1990). 
39. MINNIE FINCH. THE NAACP: ITS FIGHT FOR JUSTll'E 4 (1981). 
40. lVIissouri ex rcl. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, :342 (193i-\). 
41. State ex rel. Gain!!s v. Canada, 113 S.W.2d 783, 784--SG (Mo. 1937). 
42. Missouri, :305 U.S. at :352. 
43. NORMAN COOMBS, TilE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN AMEIUC/\ 181-82 (2004). 
44. /d. at lSIJ. 
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granted their petition in 1948 when he signed Executive Order 
9981, mandating the racial integration of America's armed 
forces. 45 In 1950, the American military began racially 
integrating fighting units at the outset of the Korean War. 46 
In that same year, the Supreme Court's decision in Sweatt 
u. Painter dealt an unprecedented legal setback to the 
"separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy u. Ferguson, 47 when the 
Court recognized that separate schools were not necessarily 
equal. 48 In Sweatt, a black man sued for admission to the 
University of Texas law school, since there was no Texas law 
school for blacks. 19 The state of Texas set up a separate law 
school for blacks and the Texas state courts held that this new 
law school was "substantially equivalent."50 Sweatt pressed his 
case for admission to the all-white University of Texas law 
school, which prompted the Supreme Court to rule that the 
new black law school was hardly "equal" to the white law 
school. 51 The case set a precedent acknowledging that 
"separate" educational facilities for blacks were not necessarily 
equal. 52 The reality was that they were almost never equal. 53 
III. BEGINNING THE ERA OF DESEGREGATION: 
THE BROWN DECISIONS 
The NAACP hoped that with Sweatt, Southern school 
districts would move to upgrade and equalize black educational 
facilities. When they didn't, the NAACP launched a frontal 
assault on the "separate" part of the "separate but equal" 
doctrine. 54 The Brown u. Topeka Board of Education55 (Brown 
I) decision of 1954 marked the opening shot in the modern 
school desegregation era, and presaged the Civil Rights 
Movement. In the case, plaintiff Linda Brown sought 
45. Exec. Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4:na (.Jul. 26, 194H). 
46. COOMBS, supra note 43, at 185--HG. 
47. Plessy v. Ferguson, 16:l U.S. 5:17, 552 (1896). 
4H. Sweatt v. Painter, :J:19 U.S. 629, G:l4-:15 (1950). 
49. !d. at 631. 
50. lei. at 632 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
51. !d. at 6:14-35 
52. !d. 
5:1. COOMBS, supra notP 4:1, at 190. 
54. !d. 
55. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown!), :'l4 7 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
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admittance to an all-white school. 56 The Supreme Court 
concluded that "[i]n the field of public education the doctrine of 
'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational 
facilities are inherently unequal."57 The Brown decision 
declared, in effect, that virtually every public school system in 
the South was in violation of the law due to their de jure-i.e., 
legally enforced-racially separate educational systems. 58 
A. The Reasoning Behind Brown 
Brown I was elegant in its minimalist simplicity. The 
decision resulted in a school district plan where "school 
children irrespective of race or color shall be required to attend 
the school in the district in which they reside and that color or 
race is no element of exceptional circumstances warranting a 
deviation of this basic principle."59 The plan endorsed both the 
concept of the colorblindness of Justice Harlan's dissenting 
opinion in Plessy, 60 as well as the concept of every child in a 
given district attending the same school, which could be 
construed as an endorsement of neighborhood schools. 61 The 
gist of the Brown ruling was that blacks who lived in the same 
geographical locality as whites could not legally be prohibited 
from attending the local school with whites solely on account of 
their race. 62 This simple colorblind concept was not accepted 
throughout much of the segregated South, and prompted 
governors like Jimmy Davis of Louisiana to consider closing 
down the public schools rather than allow white and black 
children to be educated together. 63 
When it became clear that simply ordering schools to abide 
by the Supreme Court's ruling was not enough to change 
56. ld. at 486. 
57. !d. at 4%. 
58. See id. 
59. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 1:39 F. Supp. 468, 4G9 (19fifi). 
60. In his famous dissl'nt from the majority decision in /'lessy u. Fer!{uson, Justicte 
Harlan stated. "Our constitution is color-blind, and nPithPr knows nor tolt>rates classPs 
among citizens. In J'esJwct of civil rights, all citizens are .equal hefon• tlw law." Plessy v. 
Ferguson, Hi::l U.S. fi:l7. fiG9 (1H9ti) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
61. Christim• .J. Rossell. The C:ont'Prf{cncc of Blach and White Attitudes on School 
Desc!{l'c!{ation Issu.cs /Jurin!{ the Frmr Decade Evolution of the Plans, :Hi(2) WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 613. 61 :)--11 ( 1 ~J9fi) jhl'i't•inafter Conucr!{encc of Blacl! und White Attitudes]. 
62. Sec Brown I. :117 U.S. at 49:l-94. 
63. LIVA 13AKI.:R, '!'Ill<: SJ•:CONIJ BATTLE OF NEW ()}{LEANS: '!'JJJo: HUNDRED YEAJ{ 
STIWGGLJo: To lNTJo:<:J(A'J'J•: 'I'll J•: SCJJOOLS ;)28 (1996). 
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decades of segregation-like educational practices, the Supreme 
Court issued a second ruling in 1955, sometimes referred to as 
Brown II. 64 This second ruling ordered districts to desegregate 
with "all deliberate speed," and charged federal district courts 
with crafting appropriate remedies and overseeing 
implementation of the Supreme Court's ruling, marking the 
beginning of federal judicial involvement m school 
desegregation. G5 
B. Federal Involvement and Desegregation Orders 
As Southern intransigence toward desegregation continued 
and even deepened,66 the federal government intervened. In 
1957, President Eisenhower took the unprecedented action of 
ordering National Guard troops to escort nine black children 
into a formerly all white high school in Little Rock, Arkansas, 
when Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus defied the court order 
to desegregate.67 This audacious federal intervention seemed to 
simply embolden southern segregationist leaders, some of 
whom used Little Rock as a rallying cry in their election 
campaigns.68 For example, in his 1958 campaign for governor 
of Mississippi, staunch segregationist candidate Ross Barnett 
stated, "I would rather lose my life than see Mississippi schools 
integrated."69 The Virginia Assembly passed legislation 
authorizing the closing of any school that allowed blacks and 
whites to attend together. 70 Then, in 1959, the Prince Edward 
County school board in Virginia did just that: it shut down the 
entire school system for five years rather than allow black 
children to sit next to white children in the same classroom. 71 
Not all Southern white leadership during this era was 
militantly segregationist (though most Deep South governors 
---~~- --- -~~- -~----~ 
fi4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), :349 U.S. 294, :101 (1955). 
fiG. Id. 
fi(i. Earl Black, Southern Governors and Political Change: Campaign Stances on 
Racial Segregation and Economic Development, 1950-69, THE ,J. OF POL. 707 (1971). 
67. David L. Kirp, Retreat into Legalism: The Little Rock Sehoul Desegref{ation 
Case in Historic Perspective, :10 Tm; ,J. OF POL. Scr. & POL. 443, 44:l-4 7 (Hl97). 
fiH. Black, supra note fiG, at 715. 
(i9. Id. at 710. 
70. VA. CODE ANN.§ 22-188.:! et seq. (1958), invalidated by Harrison v. Day, 10fi 
S.E.2d fi3G, fi4fi-47 (Va. 1959). 
71. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218,221 (1964). 
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were), 72 with leaders ranging from the segregation or die 
philosophy of the aforementioned Governor Barnett of 
Mississippi, to Governor John Connolly of Texas, who southern 
political expert Earl Black classified as a non-segregationist. 73 
Some limited school desegregation in the South began taking 
place in the early sixties without the need for federal 
government involvement. For example, New Orleans drew 
national attention when it finally allowed blacks to attend 
formerly all-white schools in 1961 (in spite of Governor Davis' 
segregationist bluster, and white parents who called 
themselves "the cheerleaders" harassing black children 
enrolling for the first time in all white schools). 74 Evidence of 
the coming tidal wave of changes in race relations was 
presaged by Martin Luther King's "I Have a Dream" speech at 
the Lincoln Memorial in 1963,75 which attracted a quarter-
million whites and blacks who sought for more full inclusion of 
African-Americans in mainstream American society. 
Although in some cases federal intervention was not 
necessary, the widespread need for federal involvement led to 
anti-discrimination legislation that extended to every public 
school. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provided advocates with an 
effective tool to hasten the desegregation of schools against 
Southern states which continued to be intransigent. With the 
passage of this act, much began to change. The Civil Rights Act 
allowed the federal government to withhold federal funding 
from schools that discriminated on the basis of race, religion, or 
national origins (emphasis added). With the passage of the 
Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) Act of 1965,76 
which included billions of dollars in new federal programs such 
as Head Start, the Free and Reduced Price Lunch Program, 
and Title I compensatory educational funds, the feds now had a 
very big carrot ... and an equally big stick. 77 School districts 
72. Black, su.pra note 66, at 713. 
7:l. ld. at 712. 
74. BAKER, supra note 6:~. at 41:3-15. 
7f>. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream Speech, Address at the March (Aug. 
28, 196:J). in WE HAVE A DREAM: AFRICAN-AMERICAN VISIONS OF FREEDOM 167 (Uiana 
Wells eel., 1993). 
76. Elementary and Secondary Education (ESEA) Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. H9- 10, 
79 8tat. 77 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 240 (2000)). 
77. We discuss in much more depth how federal government involvemPnt in 
schools has been steadily increasing in all areas of education since the Brown dt>cision 
in our article, Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston, The Evolution of Federal 
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that complied with the law had access to additional funds to 
help desegregate their schools, but those who did not 
desegregate risked losing all federal funding.78 
C. Social Acceptance of Brown and Desegregation 
The job of breaking down white southern resistance to 
school desegregation was made ever easier by the changing 
tides of societal and political attitudes towards civil rights for 
blacks. Scenes of peaceful civil rights protesters contrasted 
sharply with images of southern white policemen brutally 
enforcing segregationist policies against nonviolent white and 
black resisters. In the early and mid-1960s it was clear to an 
increasing number of Americans which group had the morally 
superior position. Memories of burly cops bludgeoning helpless 
black protesters for merely sitting at the "wrong" restaurant 
counter were seared deeply into the American collective 
consciousness. There is empirical evidence that resistance to 
racial segregation was breaking down throughout the South in 
the early to mid-1960s. For example, during the period 1962-65 
half as many militant segregationist governors were elected in 
the South as in the previous four year period, compared to a 
four-fold increase in the number of non-segregationist 
governors. 79 The way was being prepared for more federal 
legislation and Supreme Court edicts that would further the 
desegregation of schools. 
In 1964, the Supreme Court ruled against the Prince 
Edward County school board, ordering the district to reopen 
schools closed since 1959.80 The Griffin ruling outlawed state 
action authorizing the closing of schools to avoid desegregation, 
as well as forbidding districts from publically funding private 
schools for whites-only.81 
Involvement in Local Schools, 42 SOCIETY 49-53 (May/June 2005) [hereinafter The 
Evolution of Federal Involvement]. 
78. Michael B. Wise, School Desegregation: The Court, the Congress, and the 
President, THE SCH. REV. 159, 160 (Feb. 1974); GARY 0RFIELD, supra note 15, at 319. 
79. Black, supra note 66, at 716. 
80. Griffin v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 234 (1964). 
81. See id. 
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IV. THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE ERA AND REMEDYING 
DE JURE SEGREGATION 
[2007 
Within several years after passage of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, most de jure (legally enforced) school segregation came to 
an end as southern school systems lifted their legal bans on 
blacks and whites attending school together. The 1960s has 
been referred to as the "freedom of choice" era in American 
educational history, since schools remedied de jure segregation 
by giving students the "choice" about whether or not to attend a 
school with children from another race. 82 There is evidence to 
suggest that during the "freedom of choice" period, most 
southern school systems effectively complied with the 1954 
Brown decision by dismantling their dual de jure segregated 
systems based on race. 83 In other words, most southern blacks 
were no longer barred from attending schools in their district 
solely on account of their race. 
However, freedom of choice did not remedy the long 
standing effects of de facto segregation (segregation caused by 
reasons other than legal fiat) in every school. In reality, there 
was intense social pressure among whites, and to some extent 
even among blacks, to attend schools populated by students 
from their own race, which prevented the freedom of choice 
remedy from causing significant racial integration in schools 
that were formerly segregated by law. K4 Also, blacks and 
whites simply tended to live (and still tend to live) in different 
areas, so attending a school in one's neighborhood district often 
meant (and often still means) attending a majority one-race 
school. 85 This de facto segregation of the races is still 
widespread in many parts of the U.S. 86 In the context of the 
social activist climate of the late 1960s, and in light of the very 
influential 1966 study, "The Coleman Report," which suggested 
that racially integrated schools should help blacks 
82. JEFFHEY A. RAFFEL. HISTOIUCAL DICTIO:-.JAHY OF SCHOOL SECHE<:ATIO:\ .\:\IJ 
DESEm<EUATION 108-0!:J (19!:JH). 
S:l. CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL. The Evolution of School Desef?rc,~.;ation Plans Since 
1954, in THE END OF DESEGI<EGATION'~ 52 (Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III 
eds., 2003) [hereinafter Evolution of School Desegre,~.;ationj; Conuer,~.;ence of Blacli and 
White AttitudPs, supra note 61, at 61:1-63. 
84. Convcrf?ence ol Black and White Attitudes, supra note 61, at 615. 
85. DOUGLAS MASSEY AND NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: S~<:l;RE<:NI'!0:-.1 
\ND THE MAKI:-.JG OF THE UNDEHC'LASS 83 (1998). 
86. Id. at 8:3-114. 
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academically, H7 the Supreme Court handed down Green v. 
County School Board of New Kent County813 in 1968. This 
decision would have consequences for schools and communities 
almost as profound as Brown, and the current discourse around 
schools and race "probably owe their intellectual origins to 
Green not Brown .... "H~J As noted by desegregation expert 
Christine Rossell, it was Green that "decided that eliminating 
de jure racial discrimination was not enough to establish a 
unitary system,"90 and that creating racially mixed schools 
would be required by school systems even after they had ended 
the racial discrimination practiced under their former dual-
systems.91 
V. GREEN: AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO DESEGREGATE 
In Green, the Supreme Court ruled that the New Kent 
County, Virginia school board's "freedom of choice" 
desegregation plan was neither working nor constitutional. 92 
That it was not working, at least as a meaningful 
desegregation device, was beyond question. As the Court noted, 
"[i]n three years of operation not a single white child has 
chosen to attend Watkins school ... and 85'% of the Negro 
children in the school system still attend the all-Negro Watkins 
school. In other words, the school system remains a dual 
system."9:l Neither was the New Kent County school system 
unique. In systems across the South, and to some extent in the 
North as well, most whites and blacks attended schools where 
their race represented 90'% or more of the student body prior to 
the Green Decision. 94 
Beyond finding the freedom of choice remedy to de jure 
segregation inadequate, the Court found that there was an 
even greater responsibility on schools to desegregate by making 
H7. ,],'-'\!!<:~ S. COLEI\L\1'\, EqUALITY OF EIHH'·\TION \L 0I'I'ORTt:"iiTY 22 (U.S. 
Department of Health. Education, and Welfare Hl(i6). 
HH. 391 U.S. 4:l0 (1961-1). 
1-\9. Conuergence of Blac/1 and White Attitudes, supra note 61. at 6Hi. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Green v. County Sch. Bd., :191 U.S. 430,441-42 (1968). 
9:1. Id. at 441. 
94. Chri,;tine Rossell & David Armor. The Effectiucness of School Desegregation 
Plans: 1968-1991, :lAM. POL. RES. 267,271 (199G). 
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them reach "unitary status" in order to be considered 
desegregated. This concept was first introduced by Green "as a 
standard that segregated school systems could strive to 
attain."95 In Green the Supreme Court ruled that such school 
boards were "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take 
whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary 
system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root 
and branch . ... "96 Moreover, the Court added that any 
desegregation plans had to promise "immediate progress 
toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation,"97 toward 
the end that systems did not have "a 'white' school and a 
'Negro' school, but just schools."98 
In this holding we see the implicit assumption that had 
there never been "state imposed" segregation, then schools 
would have been naturally integrated along racial lines. This is 
an assumption that both subsequent and previous history (as 
was the case in segregated northern schools from before Brown 
up till the present time) simply has not and did not justify.99 
From a public policy perspective, the Supreme Court was 
embarking upon the creation and implementation of a specific 
policy. An important measure of the success of this policy was 
the degree to which black and white children occupied the 
same classrooms, and not, in our estimation, of whether the 
policy was efficient, politically feasible, or even equitable100 (let 
alone constitutional). By their own measures of effectiveness, 
however, the coercive plans that followed in the wake of the 
Green decision were decidedly none of the above. 101 
Since most Southern school systems had either "white 
schools or black schools," enforcing the Court's order to 
immediately undo so systemic and ingrained a reality would be 
the educational equivalent, in our opinion, of the unsettling 
95. Gary Orfield, Turnin{!, Bach to Se{!,regation, in RACE AND ETHNICITY IN TI-m 
UNITED STATES: ISSUES AND DEBATES 1:l5, 149 (Stephen Steinberg ed., 2000). 
96. Green, 391 U.S. at 437-38 (emphasis added). 
97. Id. at 4:l9 (emphasis added). 
98. Id. at 442. 
99. See generally FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 1:1 (addressing the theme that the 
roots of racial segregation are cultural and socioeconomic as well as state-imposed). 
100. See Christine J. Rossell, Usinf{ Multiple Criteria to Evaluate Public Policies: 
The Case of School Desegregation, 21 AM. POL. RES. 155 (1993) for an excellent 
discussion of how these three evaluation criteria can be used to judge the value of 
desegregation programs. 
101. ld. 
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social revolution then sweeping the country. 102 The Green 
decision listed six facets of school operations where the Kent 
County School District was racially segregated, and thus still a 
dual system. 103 The decision stated that 
[r]acial identification of the system's schools was complete, 
extending not just to the composition of student bodies at the 
two schools but to every facet of school operations - faculty, 
staff, transportation, extracurricular activities and facilities. 
In short, the State, acting through the local school board and 
school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part 
'white' and part 'Negro.•104 
These six facets have become known as the "Green Factors," 
and in order to be declared "unitary," school boards charged 
with operating dual systems have since had to demonstrate 
that they have desegregated each of these distinct areas of 
school operations. 105 The Court decision specifically mentioned 
re-zoning as a legitimate desegregation tool, 106 seeming to 
move away from the Brown I decision, a ruling which can be 
interpreted as supporting the concept of neighborhood district 
schools. 107 With the Green decision, the Supreme Court seems 
to have gone significantly beyond the letter and spirit of the 
law elucidated in Brown. De jure segregated school districts 
like New Kent County, Virginia and hundreds of others that 
would follow, were ordered to immediately create desegregated 
schools at what would ultimately seem to be any cost. 108 Green 
marks the beginning of the period of most active and at times 
intrusive involvement by the judiciary in the day-to-day 
--------·-·------------------
102. Much has been written about the disruption caused by coercive desegregation 
orders. See, e.g., CARLL. BANKSTON Ill & STEPHEN J. CALDAS, A THOU BLED DREAM: THI<: 
PROMISE AND FAILURE OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN LOUISIANA (2002) [hereinafter A 
TROUBLED DREAM]; FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13. The lead author experienced these 
disruptions first hand as a student in three different systems in three different states 
that were in the very early phases of racially desegregating, including one school where 
he was part of a small vanguard of white students bused to a formerly all black schooL 
There were race riots and the very real threat of race riots in two of the three 
desegregating schools he attended. 
103. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). 
104. ld. 
105. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, PUBLIC SCHOOL L\W 913 (2005). 
106. Green, 391 U.S. at 441. 
107. Convergence of Black and White Attitudes, supra note 61, at 614-15. 
108. See Paul Ciotti, Money and School Performance: Lessons from the Kansas City 
Desegregation Experiment, CATO POLICY ANALYSIS No. 298 11 (Cato Institute, 1998) 
[hereinafter Money and School Performance], for a study on just how much money a 
school district could spend in a largely fruitless effort to racially desegregate schools. 
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operations of local school districts.109 
VI. THE PERIOD OF SETTING LIMITS TO 
AFFIRMATIVE DESEGREGATION 
[2007 
The Green decision paved the way to the decade of greatest 
extension in judicial power over local school districts ordered to 
desegregate during the 1970s. However, there were also 
several seminal cases during this era that defined the limits of 
court action. The Swann decision, while legalizing several 
affirmative desegregation remedies, including busing, also 
stated that school districts could not be held responsible for 
racial imbalances caused by demographic factors beyond a 
school board's control, and "[n]either school authorities nor 
district courts are constitutionally required to make year-by-
year adjustments of the racial composition of school bodies once 
the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and 
racial discrimination through official action is eliminated from 
the system."110 In other words, once a system was declared 
unitary, it did not need to constantly re-adjust the racial 
balance of schools according to previously set court ratios. 
Among the most pivotal decisions of the 1970s that set 
judicial restraints was Milliken I, which banned cross-district 
desegregation remedies.l 11 The significance of the 197 4 
Milliken Court decision cannot be overstated. The Court of 
Appeals had ruled with the plaintiffs that in order to 
meaningfully desegregate the majority black Detroit City 
School District, cross district busing with the fifty-three 
majority white suburban districts would be necessary. 112 Had 
such an action been ruled constitutional and enforced, it is 
conceivable that the Detroit metropolitan area would look quite 
different today. 11 :l With forty years of experience and hindsight 
10!1. See, e.g.. Missouri v .• Jenkins, 4!1f> U.S. :i:i, ::n (1!1DO); Davis v. East Baton 
l~ougr P:u·ish Sch. Bel., 721 F.2d 1425. 1441 (f>th Cir. l9H:l); Trahan v. Lafa~·ette Parish 
Sch. Bd .. 244 F. Supp. :Jtl:l. 5tl8 (W.D. La. 1 ~Hi5). 
110. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenbmg Bel. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 4 (1971). 
111. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717. 745 (1974). 
112. Id. at 718. 
1J:l. See generally !<'OI{CED TO FAIL, supra note J:l (asserting that where 
governmental agencies trv to orchestrate racial balance> in schools through coercion, 
white flight from the suburbs have dc>mographically transfmmed the metropolitan 
!aJHbcapt•). 
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to inform us, it is highly likely that as lower socioeconomic 
students filled Detroit's suburban schools, many affluent blacks 
and whites would have either put their children in nonpublic 
schools, or fled the Detroit metropolitan area altogether. 114 
More significantly, however, had Milliken I been decided in 
favor of the plaintiffs, a precedent would have been established 
allowing cross-district busing in many metropolitan areas 
whose core-cities were found to operate a de jure segregated 
school system. Thus, not only would the schools and 
communities of Detroit's metro area have been transformed, 
but it is possible that the schools and communities surrounding 
Denver, Boston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Baton Rouge, 
Dallas, Houston, the District of Columbia, and many other 
metropolitan areas would have been radically changed as 
well. 115 Had this been the judicial decision, it is possible that 
not only would public schools in Baton Rouge be predominantly 
poor and African-American today, but so would the schools in 
its two white majority bedroom communities. 116 These two 
suburban districts received much of the white flight streaming 
from Baton Rouge as a consequence of a coercive and disruptive 
desegregation order, because the fleeing parents preferred the 
middle class schools beyond the reach of the federal 
mandate. 117 The Supreme Court's overriding principle 
established in Milliken I was that "the scope of the 
[desegregation] remedy is determined by the nature and extent 
of the constitutional violation." 118 In other words, the 
punishment had to fit the crime. 
The principle in Swann, which stated that there were limits 
to judicial reach in dismantling dual school systems, was 
applied and elaborated upon in the case of Pasadena City 
Board of Education v. Spangler. 119 The Pasadena California 
school board, which had been found to have unconstitutionally 
segregated schools, submitted a plan in 1970 that racially 
114. Emlution of School Desegregation, supra note 8:1, at 60-62. 
115. Sec generally F<mO;Jl TO FAIL, supra note 1:3. 
116. !d. 
117. Stephen .J. Caldas & Carl L Bankston Ill, East Baton Rouge, School 
Desegregation, and White Fli~-tht, 8 RES. IN THE SCHS. 21 (2001) [hereinafter East Baton 
Rouge, School Descgref.{ation j. 
118. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken[), 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974). 
119. 427 U.S. 424 (197fi). 
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balanced all schools in the district. 12° Four years later, 
however, the original phintiffs in the case brought suit against 
the board because the minority population in several schools 
once again exceeded fifty percent. 121 In reviewing the court of 
appeals decision, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the 
board, which it decreed had no control over the subsequent 
resegregation of Pasadena's schools. 122 It cited from the earlier 
Swann principle: "Neither school authorities nor district courts 
are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments 
of the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative 
duty to desegregate has been accomplished .... "123 
Importantly, the Court recognized that once a system had 
in good will imposed a desegregation plan that was approved 
by all parties in a case, 124 the district could not be held 
accountable for subsequently shifting racial compositions of 
schools resulting from changing residential demographics. 125 
Had the Court ruled differently, the desegregation histories of 
many districts could have evolved radically different than was 
the case. The disruptive and incoherent desegregation 
experience of East Baton Rouge Parish (EBR), a district that 
did indeed spend years fruitlessly chasing ever-elusive target 
racial ratios, 126 may have been a far more typical case. 
VII. MOVING FORWARD ON JUDICIALLY IMPOSED 
DESEGREGATION 
A. More Aggressive Approaches to Desegregation 
The Supreme Court case of Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 127 handed down in 1971, had 
elements that were remarkably practical, like for instance the 
120. Id. at 425. 
121. Id. at 431. 
122. Id. at 435. 
123. Id. at 436 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 
31-32 (1971)). 
124. The court ruled that the Oklahoma City School Board had likewise acted in 
good faith in implementing a court-ordered desegregation plan and was ruled to be 
unitary in Board of Education v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249 (1991). 
125. Spangler, 427 U.S. at 436-37. 
126. East Baton Rouge, School Desegregation, supra note 117, at 21-32. 
127. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
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acknowledgement that districts should not be required to 
constantly adjust school racial ratios as a consequence of 
changing demographics beyond their control. Other elements of 
the ruling, though, would ultimately prove to be unrealistic and 
even destructive. Swann was the Supreme Court's first explicit 
endorsement of busing as a legal remedy to end racial 
desegregation in formerly de jure segregated school districts. 128 
Additionally, the justices in the Swann ruling upheld the 
constitutionality of "pairing" and "grouping" of noncontiguous 
school zones (gerrymandering), endorsed majority to minority 
transfers with mandatory transportation, and allowed the use 
of racial target ratios as desegregation tools. 129 In Swann, the 
"moral momentum" of the civil rights movement reached a 
pinnacle with regards to the Court's actual manipulation of 
schools as instruments to redesign not only attendance zones, 
but society itsel£. 130 The sheer speed and weight of the 
movement carried individuals and groups along for a ride that 
was not always easy to steer or resist. 
B. Expanding the Definition of De Jure Segregation 
The 1973 Supreme Court desegregation ruling in Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, Denver, Colorado 131 was the first to 
involve a non-Southern school district. The Supreme Court 
significantly expanded judicial involvement and oversight in 
local school district affairs through its holding in this case 
when it found that the Denver school district-which had never 
operated an explicitly de jure racially dual system-was in fact 
a dual system due to racially segregative practices that affected 
a substantial portion of the city's student body. 132 After Keyes 
it became easier to find that non-Southern school districts were 
guilty of operating dual de jure systems, though there may 
have been no formal history of school segregation, and though 
racially segregative practices did not affect all of a district's 
students. In short, with Keyes the Court extended the 
128. ld. at 29-30. 
129. Id. at 25. 
130. Whereas Brown was revolutionary in ordering districts to allow students to 
attend schools in their neighborhoods without regards to race, Swann was 
revolutionary in actually forcing students to attend governmentally designated schools 
(which were not necessarily neighborhood schools) based on their race. 
131. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 191 (1973). 
132. ld. at 201. 
236 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2007 
definition of de jure segregation to include situations where 
state imposed segregation was less obvious. 1:1:3 The Court ruled 
that the Denver school board "by use of various techniques 
such as the manipulation of student attendance zones, school 
site selection and a neighborhood school policy, created or 
maintained racially or ethnically (or both racially and 
ethnically) segregated schools .... "134 
The Keyes case thus expanded the definition of de jure 
segregation to include school systems across the entire United 
States, provided it could be proven that "school authorities 
have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting 
a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and 
facilities with the school system .... "135 On the one hand, the 
Courts were finally acknowledging the reality that racial 
discrimination in educational opportunities for blacks and 
Hispanics, however subtle the discrimination, was not just 
limited to the South. On the other hand, the vast judicial 
efforts to redesign school districts that had focused on the 
South would now take on a more national scope. School 
districts charged with racial discrimination were almost always 
found guilty of de jure segregation if any actions the district 
took tended to increase racial segregation, like building a black 
school in the center of a black community. 136 According to at 
least one well-known desegregation scholar, simply the 
existence of racially identifiable schools was in itself sufficient 
evidence of a discriminatory and culpable system, even if one-
race schools were simply the result of a "neighborhood school 
policy." 137 In order to be declared unitary on the Green factor of 
"student assignment," Northern and Western school systems 
ordered to desegregate were, like their Southern counterparts, 
mandated to achieve, and in some cases maintain, certain 
specific racially balanced ratios. 138 This would prove an almost 
impossibly elusive feat, just as similar racial juggling acts had 
1:33. Id. at 210-12. 
134. Id. at 191. 
135. Id. at 201. 
136. Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at fi4. 
137. Convergence of Black and White Attitudes, supra note 61, at 614-15 (stating 
that neighborhood schools were "race neutral because studPnts were assigned to 
schools on the basis of their residence, not their race"). 
138. Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at 54. 
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failed throughout much of the South. 139 
C. White Backlash Against the New Approaches 
Shortly after Keyes the Boston school district was found 
guilty of de jure segregation in 1974, and was ordered to 
implement a mandatory student reassignment plan. 140 The 
reassignment plan was probably the most extensive plan based 
on race in U.S. history. 141 Following rioting and bus 
burnings, 142 whites began fleeing the system by the thousands, 
never to return. 143 The percent of white students in the 
average minority child's classroom in Boston decreased every 
single year from the beginning of forced busing in 1974, where 
it was 57% white, to the turn of the twenty-first century when 
it went to 15%.144 The Boston school system was at last 
declared unitary in 1989.145 Following the end of race-based 
school assignments in 2000 (a practice abandoned due to a 
parent-initiated lawsuit), 146 the Boston school system was sued 
again in 2002. It was sued for still considering the race of 
students in school admissions-only now it was accused of 
discrimination against white and not black students. 147 
D. Problems with Governmental Remedies to Social Inequality 
The imposition of change by governmental agencies, while 
it resulted in sometimes necessary change, overlooked the fact 
that schools are not just expressions of political goals, but 
social environments embedded in' American social networks 
and structures. 148 Policies like forced busing cannot succeed if 
139. See FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13, at 155-79 (documenting the failure of 
desegregation orders to maintain racial balance in a sample of several well-known non-
southern districts including Indianapolis, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, and New York). 
140. Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at 59-62. 
141. Id. at 60. 
142. See generally ,JACK TAnlm, BOSTON RIOTS: THREE CENTURIES OF SOCIAL 
VIOLENCE (2001). 
143. Evolution of School Desegregation, supra note 83, at 60-62 (documenting 
white flight as a direct result of Boston's desegregation plan). 
144. Id. at 62. 
145. Id. 
146. McLaughlin v. Boston Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (D. Mass. 1996). 
147. Boston's Children First v. Boston Sch. Comm., 183 F. Supp. 2d 382. 382 (D. 
Mass. 2002). 
148. FORCED TO Fi\IL, supra note 13, at 73. 
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they are inconsistent with social trends or the interests of 
social groups and communities, at least not in democratic 
societies where individuals have the means to choose 
alternative courses of action other than the undesirable 
government plan. 149 Certain central beliefs stemming from the 
idealism of the Civil Rights Era, like the idea that all schools 
should be racially balanced, became institutionalized in 
governmental policy and judicial rulings like Green, Swann, 
and Keyes. As in the case of researcher David Armor discussed 
below, this reality made it increasingly difficult to voice 
opposition to unproductive policies without seeming racist, 
narrow-minded, or cold-hearted. 150 However, it did not stymie 
the silent opposition of white and middle-class flight from 
school districts under coercive desegregation orders.l51 James 
Coleman, the very researcher whose influential study had been 
used to justify coercive desegregation techniques like busing, 
reluctantly arrived at this sober conclusion in the mid-
1970s.152 
The case of Professor David Armor in 1971-72 provides a 
sense of how the popular assumptions of the civil rights 
paradigm, like the efficacy of busing, influenced the political 
climate in academia. 153 Armor, who was an associate professor 
at Harvard University in the early 1970s, was told by the 
Harvard Education Review that his Boston desegregation 
study could not be published because the journal had just 
published a previous controversial article on race, and did not 
want to follow it up with yet another controversial piece-
regardless of its merit. 154 Armor's study found that a sample of 
black students in Boston were not benefiting from the huge 
149. Id. at 109 (discussing in detail the political economy of American schooling 
and the strategies families use to choose their children's schools). 
150. See generally SHELBY STEELE, WHITE GUILT 105 (2006) (discussing the 
psychological pressures prohibiting whites, in particular, from voicing opposition to any 
programs initiated during the Civil Rights movement). 
151. See FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13, at 135 (studying the implementation of 
desegregation court orders in fifteen separate school districts, and documenting 
significant white flight as a consequence of these court·ordered plans in the large 
majority of these cases). 
152. James S. Coleman, Trends in School Integration, 4 EDUC. RES., 3, 9 (1975). 
153. David Armor, Reflections of an Expert Witness, in THE END OF 
DESEGREGATION? 3, 4-5 (Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston III eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter Reflections]. 
154. Id. at 4. 
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busing experiment. 155 He was told not that his study was 
flawed, but that his findings were too controversial. 156 
However, Armor had a chance meeting on an airplane with 
then Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 157 who knew from 
first-hand experience how a study with unpopular findings 
involving race could generate heated controversy. 158 Moynihan 
listened to Armor's story and then encouraged him to submit 
his article to the more widely circulated Public Interest, which 
agreed to publish Armor's findings. 159 Armor's evidence that 
busing was not working briefly created a national buzz and 
prompted an academic adversary at Harvard to go as far as 
stealing his data. 160 Even the respected sociologist James S. 
Coleman came under fire for publishing his empirical 1975 
article, which questioned the wisdom of busing students if the 
end result was white abandonment of public schools. 161 
According to Nobel Prize winning economist Gary S. Becker, 
"Some prominent members of the American Sociological 
Association moved to have Coleman expelled for daring to 
reach this conclusion."162 
One of the most counter-productive desegregation orders 
ever handed down by a federal district court was foisted upon 
the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (EBR) in Davis v. 
East Baton Rouge Parish School Board in the early 1980s.l63 
When it settled in 2003, Davis was the longest running 
desegregation lawsuit in U. S. history. 164 Davis represents 
perhaps the greatest extent of judicial reach in the half century 
of U.S. district court rulings because the EBR system was 
155. Jd. 
156. Jd. 
157. Jd. at 4~5. 
158. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEnRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 
17, 29 (U.S. Department of Labor 1965) (concluding in a controversial report that the 
black family was disintegrating, and that this demographic factor was one of the root 
causes of "the tangle of pathologies" affecting black Americans). 
159. Reflections, supra note 153, at 4; David Armor, The Evidence on Busing, 28 
THE PULl. INT. 90 (1972). 
160. Reflections, supra note 153, at 3~2:3. See Editorial, Dangerous Orthodoxy, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 5, 1972. 
161. See Coleman, supra note 152. 
162. Obituary, James Coleman, Sociology, 14 THE U. OF CHI. CHRON., Mar. 30, 
1995. 
163. Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 721 F.2d 1425, 1441 (1983). 
164. Jd. 
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micro-managed by a federal court judge over a period of 
approximately twenty years. The system was ordered almost 
yearly to continuously re-adjust school zones, bus schedules, 
and target racial ratios in a completely fruitless attempt to 
meaningfully desegregate the schools. 165 This Louisiana 
episode is a reminder of just how disruptive and ultimately 
destructive judicial micro-management of a system could be. 
Even as whites fled with each judicially ordered desegregation 
remedy, the EBR school system was constantly ordered to 
adjust school zones throughout a quarter century in a futile 
effort to achieve certain court-mandated racial ratios. 166 The 
EBR system went from 69% white the year prior to forced 
busing and school rezoning, to only 20.5% white twenty-four 
years later when the system was finally declared, somewhat 
ironically, to be racially "unitary."167 
The Baton Rouge desegregation experience seems a prime 
example of what can happen when the interests of the 
community are ignored for un-realistic and unattainable ideals. 
Indeed, two largely middle-class adjoining suburban school 
districts of Baton Rouge owe their astounding growth and 
prosperity in part to white flight caused by the desegregation 
debacle in EBR. 168 As for the quality of the school system left 
behind in the wake of Baton Rouge's fleeing middle-class, 
desegregation expert Christine Rossell observed, "I do not 
believe that I have ever been in a school system where the 
schools were in such poor condition as a result of taxpayer non-
support."169 
VIII. THE RISE OF SOCIOECONOMIC REDISTRIBUTION 
THROUGH SCHOOLS 
The federal government not only deemed efforts to 
165. East Baton Rouge, School Desegregation, supra note 117, at 24-25. 
166. Id. at 26. 
167. Id. at 2:1 (outlining the desegregation experience of East Baton Rouge). The 
most recent student enrollment data by race was obtained from the ANNUAL FINANCIAL 
AND STATISTICAL REPORT produced by the Louisiana Department of Education and 
available on-line at http://www.doe.state.la.us/lde/uploads/7558.pdf. 
16H. East Baton Rouge, School Desegregation, supra note 117, at 26 (analyzing the 
direct influence of EBR's desegregation order on the phenomenal growth of the 
Ascension and Livingston Parishes); see generally A TROUBLED DREAM, supra note 102. 
169. CHRISTINJ•: H. ROSSELL, [MPROVIN<: THE VOLUNTARY DESE<:JtEGATION PLAN IN 
THE BATON Roue a: SCHOOL SYSTJ•:M 6 (Oct. 27, 1999). 
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redistribute the social capital of middle class America through 
the assignment of its children to schools populated by 
disadvantaged minority children as constitutional, but it also 
weighed in on the redistribution of educational funding. The 
Supreme Court in its 1973 ruling in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez first addressed the issue of 
inequitable district funding as a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection clause. 170 In Rodriguez, the 
plaintiffs argued that poorer districts, which were heavily 
populated by minorities, could not fund schools to the same 
level as richer districts, which could raise more money through 
property taxes. 171 The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Texas, 
stating that "the Texas system does not operate to the peculiar 
disadvantage of any suspect class." 172 The Court added that 
inequitable education funding was not a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment since, "[e]ducation, of course, is not 
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our federal 
constitution."173 Thus, this school finance issue appeared 
settled, and at the time similar cases against other states were 
dropped. 174 However, in Rodriguez the Court did not close the 
door on challenges that inequitable school district funding 
might violate state constitutions that did explicitly guarantee 
the rights of citizens to an equal education. 175 
Following Rodriguez, several state supreme court cases 
found that unequal funding of local school districts, as a 
consequence of the unequal distribution of wealth, was a 
violation of state law. Among the more celebrated cases were 
the California case of Serrano v. Priest, 176 and the Texas case 
of Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby. 177 Moreover, 
170. San Antonio lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973). 
171. Id. at 5. 
172. Id. at 28. 
173. Id. at 35. The Constitution makes no reference to education. Thus, the Tenth 
Amendment has typically been interpreted by courts and policy makers as giving to 
states the primary responsibility of deciding how to deliver educational services to 
their citizens. See The Evolution of Federal Involvement in Local Schools, supra note 
77, at 49-53. 
174. E.g., Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (1973); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 
457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973). 
175. KERN ALEXANDER & M. DAVID ALEXANDER, PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 807 (2004). 
176. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 619 (1971). 
177. Edgewood lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 399 (Tex.1989). 
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in Papason v. Allain, 178 the Supreme Court seemed to 
backtrack a bit on its earlier Rodriguez decision. The Court 
ruled that the plaintiffs' charge against the state of Mississippi 
for inequitably distributing state funds from sixteenth section 
lands179 to local districts was indeed a Fourteenth Amendment 
equal protection issue.180 The distinctions made by the 
Supreme Court justices in these two funding cases seem 
minute, and are perhaps even a question of legal hair-splitting. 
In actuality, the Court's position in Papason could be construed 
as a shift in favor of plaintiffs' charges that unequal district 
wealth needed to be more fairly distributed to provide more 
equitable educational outcomes. 181 Since Rodriguez, many 
state education funding programs have been challenged as 
inequitable under either federal or state law. 182 The most 
recent funding-related case in Connecticut, discussed infra, 
linked the state constitutional provisiOn for equitable 
educational opportunities to both funding and the 
socioeconomic integration of certain student groups. 183 The 
courts have been fairly evenly split against plaintiff school 
districts and state defendants, with a trend toward more 
judicial scrutiny of state legislative disbursement of 
educational monies.184 
The Supreme Court desegregation case of Freeman v. Pitts 
specifically addressed equitable funding when it established a 
"seventh" factor to Green's six factors for determining unitary 
status.185 This seventh factor was termed "quality of 
education,"186 which included "certain educational resources" 
such as teacher qualifications and experience, library books, 
student outcomes as measured on standardized tests, and "per 
pupil expenditures."187 
178. Papason v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285-86 (1986). 
179. The Land Ordinance of 1785, passed by the Continental Congress, set aside 
the sixteenth section of each surveyed township for school purposes. See United States 
v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. 440, 443 (1947). 
180. Papason, 478 U.S. at 282. 
181. ALEXANDER, supra note 105, at 800-01. 
182. Id. at 806-09. 
183. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1337 (1996). 
184. See ALEXANDER, supra note 105, at 806-08. 
185. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 482 (1992). 
186. ld. 
187. Id. at 482-84. 
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The Kansas City, Missouri School District (KCMSD) is an 
extreme case that highlights the occasional absurdities 
associated with futile attempts to reduce the black-white 
achievement gap in efforts to seek unitary status. In Missouri 
u. Jenkins, the district court judge's directive to the KCMSD to 
spend two billion dollars over a twelve-year period was upheld 
by the United States Supreme Court. 188 Since the local district 
was virtually bankrupt due to white flight and the failure of 
voters to pass school tax increases, a federal judge held the 
state partially liable for both the segregated school system and 
the cost to fix it. 189 The federal judge also ordered the local 
property taxes doubled, and an income tax surcharge on all 
those working in Kansas City but living elsewhere. 190 The 
Supreme Court ruled that such draconian measures were 
constitutional and necessary to overcome state sponsored 
segregation. 191 According to a very thorough Cato Institute 
policy analysis of the KSMSD desegregation spending program, 
Kansas City spent as much as $11,700 per pupil-more 
money per pupil, on a cost of living adjusted basis, than any 
other of the 280 largest districts in the country. The money 
bought higher teachers' salaries, 15 new schools, and such 
amenities as an Olympic-sized swimming pool with an 
underwater viewing room, television and animation studios, a 
robotics lab, a 25-acre wildlife sanctuary, a zoo, a model United 
Nations with simultaneous translation capability, and field 
trips to Mexico and Senegal. The student-teacher ratio was 12 
or 13 to 1, the lowest of any major school district in the 
country. 192 
According to the gist of the Cato study, in the ensuing 
twelve years in the KSMSD, white flight continued, black 
achievement was no better, and the black-white achievement 
gap had not been reduced. 193 Even the original federal court 
judge on the case had to admit that the massive spending had 
made little difference in school achievement, and that the 
district had done everything in its power to undo vestiges of 
188. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990). 
189. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1987). 
190. Id. at 413. 
191. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 54 (1990). 
192. Money and School Performance, supra note 108, at 1. 
193. Id. 
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past de jure segregation. 194 In Jenkins II, the Supreme Court 
ultimately restricted the federal court's far-reaching powers in 
the case, ruling unconstitutional the use of state funds to raise 
KSMSD teacher salaries to higher levels than the surrounding 
districts. 195 Jenkins II also ruled that the district did not have 
to raise minority achievement scores to the national average to 
meet the "quality of education" desegregation target, but only 
undo that part of the black-white achievement gap caused by 
previous de jure segregation. 196 In 2003, the new judge on the 
case declared the school system was unitary when he ruled 
that the black-white achievement gap had been sufficiently 
reduced, undoing all vestiges of the past de jure injury. 197 
As we see in the KSMSD, economic redistribution in school 
desegregation efforts often did not deliver the promised 
equality of educational outcomes. Indeed, it is difficult to find 
any specific instances where school desegregation worked 
according to plan. 198 More generally, Erik Hanushek's 
thorough research on educational inputs and outputs finds only 
a weak correlation between educational spending on the one 
hand, and higher student achievement on the other. 199 His 
meta-analyses suggest the limits of resource reallocation efforts 
to reduce what still remains a sizable minority-white 
achievement gap into the twenty-first century.200 Thus, we see 
that the high hopes some idealistic policy makers had of 
erasing educational inequality through both the redistribution 
of students via aggressive desegregation plans, and the efforts 
to redistribute school funding, fell far short of expectations. 201 
194. Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 40:3 (W.D. Mo. 19H7). 
195. Missouri v. Jenkins (Jenkins II), 515 U.S. 70, 71 (1995). 
196. Id. at 101. 
197. Tracy Allen, Judge Grants School District Unitary Status, THE CALL, Aug. 15, 
2003, http://www.kccall.com/news/2003/0815/Front_Page/027.html (last visited Oct. 9, 
2003). 
198. Sec generally FORC:ED TO FAIL, supra note 13. We investigated many of the 
most celebrated desegregation cases, discussed case by case in chapter 7, and did not 
identify even one that achieved the goals of racial balance and educational equity for 
all students, regardless of race. 
199. See Eric A. Hanushek, Assessing the Effects of School Resources on Student 
Performance: An Update, 19 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL'Y ANALYSIS 141-64 (Summer 
1997); Eric A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in 
Public Schools, 24 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1141-77 (Sep. 1986). 
200. Hanushek, Assessing the Effects, at 141. 
201. See FORCED TO FAIL, supra note 13, at 114-17. 
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IX. THE WEAKENING OF UNITARY STATUS AND 
THE END OF OVERSIGHT 
245 
From early in the American school desegregation drama, 
some school districts' desegregation plans, like those for 
districts such as Iberia Parish, Louisiana in 1970, were deemed 
adequate under a unitary status analysis to undo previous 
vestiges of de jure segregation, and were released from federal 
judicial oversight. 202 At the other extreme were systems like 
Lafayette Parish, Louisiana, which was just granted unitary 
status in April 2006 after forty-one years of court 
supervision. 203 The Supreme Court itself recognized the 
importance of local control over schools, stating in Board of 
Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell that "[l]ocal control over 
the education of children allows citizens to participate in 
decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs 
can fit local needs."204 In the same ruling, the Court stressed 
that desegregation orders were meant to be temporary, and not 
extended indefinitely to address changing community racial 
characteristics. 205 
The process by which a formerly "dual system" school board 
could be declared "unitary" had to be worked out in the courts 
on a case-by-case basis. The parameters set forth in the 1968 
Green decision206 were among the first specific guidelines for 
determining whether or not a system could be declared 
unitary. 207 An issue that arose early on was the length of time 
that the federal district courts could exercise oversight after a 
school system came into compliance with the court-ordered 
plan. 208 In 1961, Oklahoma City was charged with operating a 
dual segregated school system, and eleven years later, in 1972, 
it was found to still have vestiges of its dual system in place.209 
202. Henderson v. Iberia Parish Sch. Bd., 245 F. Supp. 419, 422 (1965). 
20:1. Sebreana Domingue, Desq;ref[ation Case Closure Brings a New Day, DAILY 
ADVERTISEH, Apr. 25. 2006, at A 1: see Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston. An 
Evaluation of the Consequences of Sehoul Dese![regatiun in Lafayette, Louisiana, 10 
RES. IN TH I•; SCHS. 41, 41-52 (200::!) (studying the effects of the long running Lafayette, 
Louisiana desegregation suit). 
204. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991). 
205. ld. at 241. 
206. Green v. County Scb. Bd., :191 U.S. 4:10, 441-42 (1968). 
207. ld. at 4:l5. 
208. Dowell v. Sch. Bd. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., 219 F. Supp. 427,447 (196:1). 
209. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Sch., 465 F.2d 1012. 1016 (1972). 
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The court ordered the board to adopt a more stringent 
desegregation remedy, which the board faithfully implemented 
to the satisfaction of the court. 210 
Five years later, in 1977, the district court released the 
Oklahoma City school system from court oversight, ruling that 
substantial compliance with the constitutional requirements 
had been achieved.211 However, five years later another suit 
was filed against the board to reopen the case, due to a new 
student assignment policy that the board adopted. 212 The case 
eventually wound its way to the Supreme Court in Board of 
Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, which ruled that since 
Oklahoma City had been decreed unitary, the case could not be 
reopened unless the school system was found, once again, to be 
in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.213 The Court declared that "[f]rom the very first, 
federal supervision of local school systems was intended as a 
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination"2 14 and 
"such decrees ... are not intended to operate in perpetuity."215 
Another important principle elucidated by the Supreme Court 
in the Oklahoma City case was that districts only had to 
eliminate vestiges of past de jure discrimination "to the extent 
practicable."216 This would seem to rule out some of the more 
outlandish plans, such as the Kansas City plan, which cost $2 
billion, but failed to reach its target goal of raising black 
achievement to the national norm. 21 7 
Another major issue resolved in the 1990s was whether or 
not a system could be released piecemeal from court 
supervision. In other words, could a system be freed from court 
oversight on one or more Green factors, while the courts 
continued supervision on those factors not yet adequately 
addressed? In the case of Freeman v. Pitts, the DeKalb county 
school system had achieved its racial balancing goal in the first 
year of implementation, but due to subsequent, dramatic 
-------·--· -------
210. Dowell v. Bd. of Educ. of the Okla. City Pub. Sch., 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1551 
(1985). 
211. Id. 
212. Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 241 (1991). 
213. Id. at 246. 
214. Id. at 247. 
215. Id. at 248. 
216. Id. at 250. 
217. Money and School Performance, supra note 108, at 13. 
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demographic shifts in the county, could not meet its stated 
objective in each of the following sixteen years. 218 Still, the 
district court declared that the DeKalb county system was 
unitary in student assignment, since the system had undone 
the previous de jure injury. 21 9 The court also declared the 
system unitary on every other Green factor except teacher 
assignment and resource allocation.220 The case was appealed 
by both parties, and eventually landed on the Supreme Court's 
docket, which ruled that desegregating systems could be 
released piecemeal from judicial oversight. 221 The Supreme 
Court went on to affirm that systems could not be held 
accountable for shifts in residential housing patterns beyond 
their control, and that "[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for 
its own sake,"222 seeming to backtrack on the redistribution 
approach of earlier, more coercive desegregation orders. 223 
In 1999, a federal district court judge ruled that the 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg System (CMS) was at last unitary on 
student assignment, and could no longer use race-based 
student assignment to schools or school programs. 224 
Ironically, the system was declared unitary after the parents of 
a white child filed a lawsuit claiming that the district was 
discriminating against their child based on race. 225 The six 
year old was refused admittance to a gifted program because 
"slots reserved for one race will not be filled by students of 
another race."226 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
eventually upheld the lower court ruling. 227 The court of 
appeals ruling was itself appealed to the Supreme Court, which 
refused to hear the case.228 On closer examination, though, the 
CMS system was not as desegregated as it appeared on paper, 
as it had practiced extensive student tracking, thus recreating 
218. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 4 78 (1992). 
219. Id. at 492. 
220. ld. at 482. 
221. ld. at 492. 
222. Id. at 494. 
223. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 (1968). 
224. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Sch., 57 F. Supp. 2d 228, 232 (1999). 
225. ld. at 284. 
226. ld. at 287 (emphasis in original). 
227. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. ofEduc., 269 F.3d 305,312 (4th Cir. 2001). 
228. Capacchione v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 535 U.S. 986 (2002). 
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segregation within its school system.229 Moreover, as soon as 
the CMS schools were declared unitary, the system began to 
resegregate almost immediately,2:1° suggesting that without 
coercive court oversight many parents were not interested in 
the court's vision, and had only been reluctantly complying 
with it. Additionally, there remains an enormous black-white 
achievement gap among CMS students,231 though one of the 
explicit justifications for attempting to desegregate the system 
in the first place was to close this gap.232 
X. DESEGREGATION ENTERS A CONTENTIOUS FUTURE 
A. Connecticut and Missouri 
After more than half a century of judicially mandated 
school desegregation efforts, the early lofty vision of the 
Supreme Court to not have "a 'white' school or a 'black' school, 
but just schools"233 has still not been fully realized, and indeed, 
based on resegregation patterns, may be more elusive than 
ever.234 What does the future of desegregation litigation hold? 
The Connecticut case of Sheff v. O'Neill, and its tentative 
settlement in 2003 may provide a glimpse into the new age of 
desegregation type litigation. 235 In this unique case, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court potentially opened up a new era in 
school desegregation by ruling that the Hartford public school 
system violated students' rights by not providing an equal 
educational opportunity to its largely poor black and Hispanic 
229. Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, White Privilc!{e in a Desegregatin!{ School System: 
The Charlotte·Mecklenburg Schools Thirty Years After Swann, in THE END cw 
DESEGREGATION? 106, 106 (Stephen .J. Caldas & CarlL. Bankston III eds., 2003). 
230. STEPHEN SAMUEL SMITH, BOOM FOR WHOM'? EDUCATION, DESEGREGATION 
AND DEVELOPMENT IN CHAHLOTTE 60 (2004). 
231. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBUJW SCHOOLS PERCENT OF STUDENTS AT ACHIEVEM~;NT 
LEVELS FOR END-OF-COURSE TEST RESULTS (2007), http://www.cms.kl2.nc.us/ 
departments/instrAccountability/EOC06-07/2007EOCDistrictA!l.pdf (showing only 
49.8%, of black students in the CMS scored at proficient levels, compared to 83.6% of 
white students). 
232. SMITH, supra note 230, at 203. 
2:33. Green v. County Sch. Ed., :'l91 U.S. 430, 442 (1968). 
2:34. Amelia E. Lester, Still Separate After All These Years?, HGSE NEWS, May 1, 
2004. http://www.gse.harvard.edu/news/features/orfield05012004.html. 
235. Sheff v. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
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students, as prescribed in the state's constitution.236 In Sheff, 
the court ruled that the de facto racial, ethnic, and economic 
segregation of Hartford's schools was unconstitutional, and 
ordered cross-district desegregation remedies to rectify the 
racial and ethnic segregation of the capital city's schools.237 
Sheff removed the desegregation issue from the federal 
courts and made it a state issue -placing on the state of 
Connecticut the onus of providing an equal educational 
opportunity to all Connecticut students in accord with the state 
constitution.238 The plaintiffs brought the case against the 
Hartford school district in 1989, and the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in 1996, ordering 
Hartford's schools to desegregate.239 In 2003 the plaintiffs in 
the case won a partial victory, with the Connecticut Supreme 
Court awarding a tentative settlement of $45 million to the 
impoverished Hartford district over a four-year period to 
decrease de facto racial and economic segregation.240 However, 
the state of Connecticut's Office of Fiscal Analysis estimated 
that the cost of the desegregation remedies, which included 
building two new magnet schools241 per year for four years, 
was likely to soar to $89 million dollars,242 an amount that 
proved to be an underestimate. 243 
Since the case focused on both de facto and socioeconomic 
segregation, Sheff could inspire similar lawsuits against other 
states in which districts are segregated into rich and poor, but 
have been exempt from desegregation litigation due to there 
being no history of de jure segregation. Sheff could also 
236. ld. at 1281-82. 
2:37. ld. at 1290. 
2:38. ld. at 1281-82. 
2:39. ld. 
240. CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, QUESTIONS ABOUT SHEFF V. 
O'NEILL SETTLEMENT (Feb. 1:3, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/ed/rpt/200:i-R-
0214.htm. 
241. "'Magnet schools,' as generally understood, are public schools of voluntary 
enrollment designed to promote integration by drawing students away from their 
neighborhoods and private schools through distinctive curricula and high quality." 
Missouri v. ,Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 40 n.6 (1990) (citing Janet R. Price & Jane R. Stern, 
Ma{{net Schools as a Strate{{y for lnte{{ration and School Reform, 5 YALE L. & PoL'Y 
REV. 291 (1987)). 
242. CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, supra note 240. 
243. Lawmahers Won't Vote on Sheff Settlement, BOSTON GLOBE, July 21, 2007, 
available at http://www.boston.com/news/educationlk_12/articles/2007/07/21/ 
]a wmakers_ wont_ vote_on_sheff_settlement. 
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conceivably inspire lawsuits against systems that have 
eliminated vestiges of de jure segregation, but are still 
socioeconomically segregated. According to Richard 
Kahlenberg, this could potentially re-open the legality of cross-
district busing, 244 something ruled unconstitutional for racial 
desegregation purposes in the 1974 Milliken I case.245 More 
recently, Kahlenberg has argued that metropolitan 
socioeconomic desegregation remedies could be entirely 
defensible, and could free plaintiffs from previous federal court 
rulings which severely limited desegregation strategies based 
on race. 246 
We agree with Kahlenberg that the Sheff case may indeed 
have tremendous implications for re-instituting cross-district 
busing and other "affirmative" type strategies for the purpose 
of socioeconomically integrating school systems. However, in 
states where poverty and race are closely correlated, there is 
little material difference between socioeconomic and racial 
segregation.247 As such, it would seem that similar undesirable 
consequences would follow from the affirmative type 
desegregation remedies proffered by Kahlenberg. Sheff already 
has some unsettling similarities with the $2 billion Kansas 
City, Missouri case.248 One similarity is the open-ended nature 
of the settlement. After the prior settlement expired without 
the school district reaching its desegregation goals, the 
plaintiffs in the Sheff case tentatively settled for an additional 
$112 million to be spent on magnet schools, charter schools, 
and other programs over the next five years to help further 
desegregate the city's schools. 249 Another similarity with the 
Kansas City episode and Sheff is that the magnet schools being 
built in Hartford to comply with the settlement are counting on 
the surrounding suburban districts to supply middle class 
students, thus increasing the percentage of minority students 
244. RICHARD D. KAHLENBEHG, ALL 'l'OGETHEH Now: CREATING MIDDLE-CLASS 
SCHOOLS THROUGH PUBLIC SCHOOL CHOICE 216~17 (2001). 
245. Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken[), 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). 
246. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Economic School Integration, in THE END OF 
DESEGREGATION? 149 (Stephen J. Caldas & CarlL. Bankston Ill eds., 2003). 
247. See generally A TROUBLED DREAM, supra note 102. 
248. Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990). 
249. Lawmakers Won't Vote on Sheff Settlement, supra note 243. The prior 
desegregation goal was to have at least 30% of the students enrolled in racially 
integrated schools by the settlement's expiration date, but as of 2007, only 9%, of the 
students attended schools that qualified as racially integrated. Id. 
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attending racially integrated schools from 10% to at least 
30%.250 In the event that the students in the surrounding 
suburban districts do not participate in the "build it and they 
will come" plan to the extent envisioned, the Hartford district, 
like Kansas City, could be left with the full bill to run half 
empty schools including transportation costs, which are 
conservatively projected to run into the millions of dollars.251 
B. The Michigan Cases 
The year 2003 saw other landmark cases that could 
potentially impact the future of school desegregation in the 
United States. In the University of Michigan cases Grutter u. 
Bollinger252 (law school admissions) and Gratz u. Bollinger253 
(undergraduate admissions), the Supreme Court handed down 
its most momentous affirmative action decision since the Bakke 
case254 of 1978. In Gratz, the Supreme Court ruled that the 
University of Michigan's undergraduate admission policy of 
awarding points solely based on an applicant's race was 
unconstitutional. 255 However, in Grutter the Supreme Court 
held that the university's "compelling interest" in fostering 
diversity met the "strict scrutiny" standard required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment when governmental bodies make 
distinctions based on racial categories. 256 Thus, the Court 
upheld the university's law school policy of giving preferences 
to minorities in its admissions procedures, as long as race was 
but one factor among many considered in the admissions 
process. 257 This legal allowance for public institutions to 
racially discriminate between individuals has ensured that the 
controversy swirling around state efforts to promote diversity 
(whether in K-12 or university settings) would continue for 
250. CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH, SHEFF V. O'NEILL 
SETTLEMENT (Jan. 27, 2003), http://www.cga.ct.gov/2003/olrdata/ed/rpt/2003-R-
0112.htm. 
251. Id. 
252. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003). 
253. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003). 
254. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269 (1978) (this is a 
landmark decision where the Supreme Court bars quota systems in college admissions 
while affirming the constitutionality of affirmative action programs giving an 
advantage to minorities). 
255. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71. 
256. Grutter, 539 U.S. at :333. 
257. See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-71; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337. 
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some time to come.258 
While the Supreme Court's rulings in the Grutter and Gratz 
cases do not directly implicate K-12 schools, they do have 
potential implications for elementary and secondary education. 
For example, in light of the Gratz ruling, Little Rock Arkansas 
officials were considering dropping using race as the sole 
criteria for admittance to some magnet schools. 259 On the other 
hand, the Grutter ruling reiterates the high court's position 
that if the state has an interest in diversifying the racial 
composition of state institutions they can consider the race of 
individuals in a government selection process. Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, in her dissension from the Court's ruling in 
the undergraduate Gratz case, stated, "The stain of generations 
of racial oppression is still visible in our society, and the 
determination to hasten its removal remains vital."260 
Ginsburg thus reveals that there is thinking on the Supreme 
Court that the vestiges of racial oppression which school 
desegregation has been attempting to undo still linger. 261 
Moreover, her statement implies that governmental action to 
undo these vestiges is still necessary, and indeed, "vital."262 
Thus, we still see a judicial orientation at the highest levels of 
American government that is favorable to upholding the use of 
race as a factor in school admissions. 
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, speaking for a majority of 
the court in Grutter, did indicate that she thought the end of 
racial preferences in university admissions was in sight-but 
were still necessary for the time being. 263 She wrote, "We 
expect that in 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences 
will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved 
today."264 It would be interesting to know upon what logic 
258. The Plessy and Grutter Decisions, supra note 31, at 67. Technically, the 
controversy could rage until at least 2028, the date at which Justice O'Connor's "sunset 
clause" would end, and, according to the former Supreme Court justice, we will no 
longer need affirmative action type policies. Id. 
259. Caroline Hendrie, City Boards Weigh Rule on Diversity, EDUCATI0;\1 WEEK ON 
THE WEB, November 5, 2003, http://www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.cfm?slug= 
10Deseg.h23. 
260. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 276. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. :~06, 343 (2003). 
264. Id. 
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O'Connor based this prediction. 265 Does she envision the 
elimination of the minority-white achievement gap within a 
quarter century, so that minorities will be able to compete on 
the level playing field of university academic admissions 
requirements? If so, her position would imply that she foresees 
a significant improvement in k-12 minority education. 
However, given the trend toward the continued re-segregation 
of American public schooling, and the association of segregated 
minority schooling with inferior academic outcomes266-
especially for African American and Hispanic students-
O'Connor's vision seems overly optimistic. One outcome of the 
Grutter decision seemed more certain: in the words of another 
legal scholar it will likely "lead to confusion, to controversy, 
and to litigation."267 
C. The Seattle I Louisville Case 
The litigation came soon, but with a conservative twist. By 
the second half of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
the Court had moved from deciding whether schools would be 
forced to redistribute their students to whether they would be 
allowed to do so. At the end of 2006, the Supreme Court began 
to hear the cases of Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District and Meredith v. Jefferson County Board 
of Education.268 Seattle, Washington had not been under a 
desegregation order, but its school board had decided 
voluntarily to take race into consideration when setting limits 
on how many children of each race could go to each school. 269 
Jefferson County, which contains Louisville, Kentucky, had 
been under a court order to desegregate from 1973 to 2000.270 
265. Upon close scrutiny, .Justice O'Connor's assertion seems more based in 
wishful thinking than in sound empirical social science. See Carl L. Bankston III, 
Grutter v. Bollinger, Weak Foundations? 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 66 (2006). 
266. See Carl Bankston III & Stephen ,J. Caldas, Majority African American 
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Achievement, 75 Soc. FORCES fi35, 535-55 (199G). 
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415 (2003). 
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The latter district had been declared unitary but its school 
board, which had fought desegregation in the 1970s, had 
chosen to maintain its own plan to re-assign students in order 
to maintain racial balance in the schools, even after it was no 
longer required to do so. 271 Parents in both locations whose 
children were unable to enroll in nearby or desired schools as a 
result of race-conscious assignment sued, maintaining that this 
was discriminatory. 272 
On June 28, 2007, the Court decided the issue in Parents 
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. 
The Court ruled against school board procedures of race-
conscious assignment, and Justices Breyer, Stevens, Souter, 
and Ginsberg dissented from the decision, convinced that the 
school boards' strategies of race conscious assignment did 
indeed serve a compelling state interest. 273 Justice Kennedy 
concurred with the decision in this case, arguing that schools 
may sometimes use race conscious approaches, but that the 
districts did not sufficiently tailor their plans to achieve their 
goals. 274 Justice Roberts seemed to dismiss the use of race in 
assignment altogether, remarking that "the way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race."275 
The split decision of the Court on the question of whether 
racial redistribution of students would even be allowed, much 
less compelled, indicated that American desegregation law had 
moved from commitment to uncertainty. If there is any 
certainty with regards to the future of school desegregation 
litigation, it is that we can almost certainly expect it. Justice 
Kennedy's concurring opinion leaves the door open for more 
officially sanctioned governmental discrimination based on 
race, and the consequent claimed injury of individuals who will 
protest the injustice of said discrimination. Kennedy 
expounded, "In the administration of public schools by the state 
and local authorities it is permissible to consider the racial 
makeup of schools and to adopt general policies to encourage a 
1973). 
271. Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2741. 
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diverse student body, one aspect of which is its racial 
composition."276 
XI. UNCERTAIN FUTURE: PREDICTIONS 
As judicial desegregation in the U.S. faces this uncertain 
future, Americans debate its merits and alternatives. Some 
current black American leaders question the notion that all-
black institutions are somehow inferior, which they suggest is 
implied by school desegregation efforts. 277 In fact, in Topeka, 
Kansas, where the desegregation era was born, the former 
black superintendent blamed the continuing poor academic 
performance of black students on desegregation itself, stating 
on the 50th anniversary of the Brown decision that "the closing 
of black neighborhood schools-with their traditions, 
yearbooks, mottoes, fight songs and halls of fame-ripped the 
centerpiece out of those communities."278 
With the desirability and possibility of racial desegregation 
open to question from so many quarters, some have focused 
their hopes on the redistribution of students by class, rather 
than race.279 Will the courts pursue the socioeconomic 
desegregation of schools as a means of attempting more racial 
desegregation? If so, this could entail a new round of extensive 
judicial intervention in American schools aimed at 
redistribution on socioeconomic rather than racial grounds. 280 
If, as we argue here, racial redistribution has not worked to 
meaningfully desegregate schools, there is no reason to believe 
that the socioeconomic version would, even if race and 
socioeconomic status were not so intertwined in American 
society. 
276. Id. at 2792. 
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With the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor from the 
Supreme Court, a voice for moderation who represented the so-
called "swing vote" on controversial court rulings like the 
Grutter decision, and her replacement with the more 
conservative jurist Samuel Alita, the Supreme Court's 
orientation to school desegregation has taken a more 
conservative, strictly constructivist orientation. We see this 
increased conservative influence in the 2007 Seattle/Meredith 
decisions. However, if desegregation activists take their cause 
to state courts, as they have in Connecticut, the composition of 
the Supreme Court may make little or no difference in future 
desegregation litigation. If this later scenario develops, we may 
be in for many more tumultuous years of contentious, 
expensive, divisive, and potentially counter-productive 
desegregation litigation. 
To summarize, in 1954 the United States embarked on a 
long and sinuous legal road in its efforts to undo the "separate 
but legal" legacy left in the wake of the Plessy v. Ferguson 
decision of 1896. Whereas the majority of de jure school racial 
segregation has been eliminated, in places like Louisiana, 
almost two-thirds of the state's districts were still under court 
supervisiOn to desegregate in 2007.281 Moreover, de facto 
segregation was the norm across much of the country, with 
meaningful school integration stagnating, and school racial 
resegregation taking place in many parts of the country.282 
Though plaintiffs in the future may shift legal strategies and 
file suit against states for allowing de facto racial segregation 
to persist, legal strategies, as we have seen in the Connecticut 
Sheff case, have limits as to their effectiveness in creating 
meaningfully integrated schools. Until the U.S. deals with the 
underlying causes of school racial segregation, namely 
socioeconomic stratification, which according to the 
government's latest figures has never been greater,283 we are 
likely to continue to see racially identifiable schools long into 
the twenty-first century. 
281. Chris Kirkham, Civil Rif{hts Struggle Lives on in La.:~ Public Schools, NEW 
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE. July 28, 2007, http://blog.nola.com/times-
picayune/200 7/0 7 /ci vi l_righ ts_struggle_li ves_on. h tm I. 
282. Amelia E. Le~ter, supra note 234. 
283. Greg lp, Income Inequality Gap Widens, WALL ST .• J., Oct. 12, 2007, at A2, 
available at http://online. wsj.com/article_email/SB11921fiS2241 :lfifi7069-l 
MyQjAxMDE:30TEyMjExN'l'I4Wj.html. 
